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Executive summary 
 
This report documents an exercise undertaken by development scholars based at the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and the University of Sussex (both in Brighton, UK) to 
explore the interactions among three key goals of international development policy and 
practice, namely reducing inequalities, accelerating sustainability and building secure and 
inclusive societies. Experts from a selection of relevant fields of study convened in three 
deliberative foresight workshops to explore these three themes individually and their 
interactions, using an adapted scenario-building methodology. The report describes the 
adapted scenario methodology used during the workshops, presents the future scenarios 
generated during each event, and analyses the insights emerging from the scenarios as well 
as the workshop discussions leading up to them. The analysis draws attention to potential 
tensions and conflicts, as well as complementary and mutually reinforcing dynamics, which 
may be expected to emerge between the three themes in the future.  
 
To carry out this exercise we used the foresight methodology of scenario building, but with 
two key variations compared to typical scenario exercises. First, we adopted a triangular 
framework called the ‘trilemma’, which allowed us to consider the interaction among three 
axes instead of two, which is more common. Second, in order to encourage workshop 
participants to engage with the scenario-building exercise even though the defining axes had 
already been pre-selected – rather than being generated by the participants during the 
process, as is more common – we used three documents as source material, to prime the 
deliberations. These documents were summarised as diagrams and presented to the 
workshop participants for discussion, critique and debate. 
 
During the scenario-building activity, a two-stage process was adopted in order to encourage 
the workshop participants to consider the potential for negative or ‘dystopian’ interactions 
among the three themes, as well as positive and mutually reinforcing interactions. The 
discussions around the source material as well as the scenario-building activity were 
documented in order to capture key insights and lessons emerging from the exercise. These 
included the importance of adopting clear definitions of key terms, aligned with underlying 
values and intentions, in order to avoid ambiguity and confusion; and to clearly appreciate 
the potential for tensions among goals that may be individually desirable but mutually 
antagonistic. The potential meanings of sustainability, inequality, security and inclusion are 
unpacked in this report, and potential interactions between pairs of these themes (e.g. 
sustainability with equality) are discussed. 
 
The deliberative process documented in this report represents one part of a wider 
programme of work under way within IDS, linked to colleagues and initiatives at the 
University of Sussex, to understand more deeply the challenges involved in pursuing 
multiple development goals simultaneously. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The challenges of global development are multiple, complex and interconnected. In 2016, 
the international community adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including 
169 individual targets, which are intended to focus development policy globally and the 
actions of public, private and community sectors over the following 15 years. The goals and 
targets range across diverse fields of public policy and implicate swathes of productive, 
social and reproductive life, from industry, finance, energy and agriculture to education, 
health care, sanitation, social protection and environmental stewardship. One might want to 
read the SDGs as a set of harmonious and mutually reinforcing aims; but what if, in reality, 
some of them are in mutual conflict or tension with each other? If the SDGs reflect an 
overarching ambition to create a more equal, sustainable, inclusive and secure world, it is 
important to consider whether and how a range of individual priorities can be achieved 
together. 
 
In this document we report the deliberations of a group of scholars who came together to 
explore the interactions among three important themes of international development policy 
and practice. We focused on the goals of reducing inequality, accelerating sustainability and 
building secure and inclusive societies, which were adopted as three thematic priorities by 
IDS, Brighton in 2015 for the present five-year period (2016–20) (IDS 2015). This study 
forms part of a current programme of work within IDS to analyse and investigate the 
interactions among these three development goals in a methodical, systematic way. Our 
approach was to create a space to think about how the three themes relate to one another 
and how policymakers, academics and practitioners may approach them coherently and 
strategically. The deliberations and insights documented in this report are being fed into a 
subsequent process of conceptual analysis and theory development, building towards a 
coherent new development research agenda. While this work programme is initially aimed at 
strategic coordination of research and engagement activities within IDS, the issues we have 
explored are relevant much more widely as challenges of sustainable and equitable global 
development. We are confident that our deliberations and conclusions will be interesting and 
relevant to other development scholars and organisations as they address similar 
challenges. For example, this work should complement efforts being made by other scholars 
to understand how the SDGs relate to one another and how they might be pursued 
collectively rather than piecemeal (e.g. Nilsson, Griggs and Visbeck 2016). 
 
In this small study we used methods and tools of foresight, an approach designed to help 
communities and organisations consider the challenges and opportunities approaching from 
the future, which is intrinsically uncertain. Development studies and policy are necessarily 
concerned with anticipating, and especially shaping, the future. Foresight methods have 
been used to explore emerging challenges and opportunities in several fields of international 
and sustainable development policy and practice including energy, climate change, non-
communicable diseases, ‘big data’, and the potential of edible insects as food for humans 
and livestock (Bingley 2014; Harcourt, Heinzen and Muliro 2004; MacGregor et al. 2014; 
Spratt and Baker 2015; Glover and Sexton 2015). In this case, we adapted the foresight 
method of scenario building as a means of enabling a group of knowledgeable experts to 
consider the ways in which drivers of equality and inequality, sustainability and 
unsustainability, security/insecurity and inclusion/exclusion might interact together and 
shape the future of global sustainable development. 
 
The report is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the foresight methodology we 
used, with an explanation and justification for the adaptations we made to the conventional 
scenario matrix, which allowed us to grapple with three intersecting themes instead of two.  
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In Section 3 we present the analytical summaries we produced, in the form of diagrams, 
based on three source documents, which we used to inform and stimulate the deliberations 
of participants in three scenario-building workshops. Alongside our original diagrams and 
their accompanying explanations, we document the key points of comment, discussion, 
criticism and elaboration that were raised by the participants during the workshops. In 
Section 4 we give a brief account of the scenario-building process, although the scenarios 
themselves are presented in Annexes A and B. In Section 5 we identify the key insights that 
emerged from the workshop discussions and scenario-building processes, focusing 
particularly on the light they shed on the three individual themes and on their pair-wise 
interactions. Section 6 is a short post-script discussing the implication of ‘Brexit’ – the United 
Kingdom’s proposed exit from the European Union – including the challenges and 
opportunities it presents for international development policy and the achievement of the 
SDGs. 
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2 Methodology 
 
For this project we adapted the common foresight method of scenario building. Scenarios 
may be used with groups of experts and stakeholders to explore their hopes, fears and 
expectations about the future of a given issue or topic of concern (Wright, Cairns and 
Bradfield 2013). We have described our methodology and its innovative features in detail in 
a separate, Open Access publication (Glover, Hernandez and Rhydderch 2016). Here we 
provide a brief summary. 
 
Scenario building is typically done within a two-dimensional matrix in which two axes, x and 
y, intersect to create four ‘scenario spaces’. These spaces are then populated with four 
different scenarios, each representing an alternative possible future. The axes are scales 
consisting of binary or sometimes continuous variables. These variables define key 
characteristics of each scenario space, so that the four scenarios are forced to display 
contrasting features with the intention that, as a set, they will draw out a broad range of the 
issues, processes and dynamics policymakers and stakeholders should consider when they 
think about the future. Each individual scenario is best appreciated, not as a prediction of an 
exact future that has about a 25 per cent likelihood of coming to pass, but as the product of a 
process of deliberation and creativity that has been designed to encourage participants to 
reflect on current trends and imagine future possibilities. The four scenarios are less useful 
individually than as a set. 
 
Normally, the two axes are selected through a facilitated, participatory process that begins 
with a brainstorming exercise and ends by identifying two major trends or ‘drivers of change’ 
that the workshop participants consider to be both very important and highly uncertain. 
These two drivers are converted into the axes that define the matrix of four scenario spaces. 
This process of brainstorming and reflection engages the participants in a discussion and 
helps to get the subsequent scenario-building process under way. In this project, however, 
our axes were predefined, and instead of two axes we had three (equality–inequality, 
sustainability–unsustainability, and security/inclusion–insecurity/exclusion). This situation 
presented us with two challenges. First, we needed a way to stimulate our workshop 
participants to engage in the process and commit their time and attention to it, even though 
basic premises for the discussion had already been determined and the key drivers/axes of 
interest had already been selected in advance. Second, we needed a structure that would 
help the group to explore the interactions among three different themes rather than two. 
 
We convened three scenario workshops, each of which focused on one of the three main 
themes of the project while also bearing in mind the interaction with the other two themes. 
We selected participants from IDS and the University of Sussex based on their expertise in 
relation to the key topic under consideration in each workshop. The three workshops 
unfolded in three phases, as follows. 
2.1  A modified ‘drivers of change’ exercise 
Typically, scenario building begins with a brainstorming exercise that is used to generate a 
list of trends and drivers of change from which a couple of axes is selected, which will form 
the scenario matrix and create four scenario spaces. Instead of this, we organised a 
discussion around the implicit ‘programme theories’ we found in three source documents. 
We interpreted the three international development goals under consideration (accelerating 
sustainability, reducing inequality, and building secure and inclusive societies) as 
‘programmes of action’ and selected three IDS documents whose authors had examined 
these themes, reviewed relevant scholarly literature, theory, concepts and evidence, and 
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explored the intellectual strands that could be used to inform these action programmes. We 
interpreted these intellectual strands as if they were a kind of programme theory for each 
theme. The three documents were as follows: 
 
 Justino, P. and Moore, M. (2015) Inequality: Trends, Harms and New Agendas, IDS 
Evidence Report 144, Brighton: IDS 
 Luckham, R. (2015) Whose Security? Building Inclusive and Secure Societies in an 
Unequal and Insecure World, IDS Evidence Report 151, Brighton: IDS 
 Schmitz, H. and Scoones, I. (2015) Accelerating Sustainability: Why Political 
Economy Matters, IDS Evidence Report 152, Brighton: IDS 
 
As well as analysing the text of each document, we also interviewed at least one author of 
each document in order to fully understand their analysis and arguments. It should be noted 
that the authors of these three documents had not been commissioned to carry out 
systematic reviews of their respective topics, but to offer informed and thoughtful 
perspectives on them, which would reflect the values of IDS as a research institution with a 
mission to work for human development worldwide. The reports’ authors are not programme 
designers or managers, however their evidence- and scholarship-based analyses could be 
seen to resemble programmes insofar as they include features such as problem diagnosis, 
analysis of mechanisms and relationships, priority-setting and strategy development. This 
resemblance allowed us to interpret the documents as exemplifying implicit programme 
theories, even though they had not been written with that intention. 
 
In addition to a close reading of the three documents, we also undertook a structured 
analysis of each one using the qualitative analysis software NVivo (v.11, QSR International 
Pty Ltd., 2015). Having done this preparatory work, we needed a means of presenting the 
contents of the three documents to the workshop participants, so that everyone involved 
could engage with the process on a common foundation. Therefore, we created three 
diagrams that were designed to summarise the arguments and propositions we found in 
each of the three documents. We presented all three diagrams to the participants in each of 
the three workshops, for them to discuss and critique. This process substituted for the 
brainstorming exercise with which a typical scenario workshop begins because it primed the 
workshop participants with information and ideas about the topic of each workshop, in order 
to stimulate their thinking and get the conversation flowing. 
2.2  A scenario-building exercise using the ‘trilemma’ 
framework 
Instead of the classic two-dimensional matrix with four quadrants, we adopted a triangular 
framework for our scenarios, called the ‘trilemma’ (see Figure 2.1), which we adapted from a 
previous scenario exercise carried out by the energy company Royal Dutch Shell (2005). 
The trilemma framework helped us to explore the interaction among three major axes rather 
than two. The blue triangle in Figure 2.1 illustrates the interaction among the three positive 
goals of equality, sustainability, and security/inclusion; each corner of the triangle is in a 
direct relationship with the other two corners. The larger, grey triangle illustrates the 
interaction among the corresponding negative poles of inequality, unsustainability and 
insecurity/exclusion. The trilemma framework also illustrates interactions between positive 
and negative aspects (for example the positive goal of ‘sustainability’ sits in the middle of 
one of the sides of the large grey triangle, in which position it is directly connected to the 
negative outcomes of ‘insecure and exclusionary’ and ‘unequal’). In this way the diagram 
helped to ensure that the workshop discussions would focus on potential negative 
interactions (such as tensions and trade-offs) as well as positive ones (e.g. mutually 
supportive or reinforcing relationships). We often referred to the blue triangle as the 
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favourable space within which development actors should strive to achieve a positive 
alignment of the three competing development goals. 
 
To begin developing the scenarios, we asked participants to focus at first on possible 
negative outcomes for the goal in which they were particularly interested; for example, 
participants in the ‘reducing inequalities’ workshop began by exploring scenarios of high 
inequality. In particular, we wanted participants to consider the possibility that negative 
outcomes for the goal in which they were most interested (e.g. inequality) could be 
associated with positive outcomes for the other two goals (e.g. sustainable and 
secure/inclusive). This uncomfortable mental exercise ensured that the scenario-building 
process would tease out possible negative associations or relationships. 
 
Figure 2.1 Key features of the trilemma framework 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
The bold red lines in Figure 2.2 delineate a kite-shaped scenario space, which is divided by 
the dotted red line into two triangles. Both the red kite and the two red triangles contain an 
area that falls within the blue zone, but at first we asked participants to concentrate on the 
grey, more dystopian portion where negative interactions would come to the fore. At this 
point, the workshop participants were split into two small groups and each one focused on 
one of the small red triangles; we designed this procedure to ensure that the interaction of 
the main theme with each of the secondary themes would receive full consideration in each 
workshop. This entailed that the two small groups generated the outlines of two scenarios 
that were dystopian to some degree. They presented their dystopian scenarios to each 
other, and these were discussed for a short time before we moved to the final phase. For 
this phase, the two groups were united into one again and the whole group worked on a 
third, unified scenario that would bring out the interactions between the axis of principal 
concern and both of the secondary axes, i.e. a single scenario occupying the space of the 
red kite in Figure 2.2. 
 10 
Figure 2.2 Scenario spaces (example for the (in)equality scenario exercise) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.3  A wind-tunnelling analysis 
We loosely based the final phase of the workshops on the foresight method of ‘wind-
tunnelling’ (Rhydderch 2009). Wind-tunnelling may be used to evaluate the ‘fitness’ of a 
given policy or strategy within the scenarios that have just been generated, but we used it as 
a way to think about policies and strategies that might be used to steer towards a desired 
future located somewhere in the ‘blue zone’, in scenarios characterised by greater security 
and inclusion, sustainability, and equality. Our scenarios were set 30 years into the future, 
around the year 2046. 
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3 Programme theory analysis 
3.1  Building secure and inclusive societies 
Our source material for understanding the drivers of human security and insecurity, inclusion 
and exclusion was the IDS Evidence Report by Luckham (2015). Our summary of the ideas 
we found in the document is depicted in Figure 3.1. We presented this diagram alongside 
the others (see below) in each of the three workshops and discussed it for a short time with 
the participants. 
Figure 3.1 Programme theory on drivers of (in)security and in/exclusion  
 
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Luckham (2015). 
 
In Figure 3.1 the small, dark green circle in the approximate centre of the diagram 
represents the goal or aspiration of a secure and inclusive society, which is characterised by 
some essential features including democracy, accountability, peace, equity and stability. The 
yellow triangles are arrows, which represent forces that operate to include and exclude 
people and groups from mainstream society. However, as Luckham (2015) points out, a 
desirable conception of human security goes far beyond the bare minimum of freedom from 
violence or crime; in fact, a narrow concept of security along such lines could be used to 
justify a police state of surveillance, control and punishment. Luckham argues in favour of a 
richer and more generous concept that he calls ‘security in the vernacular’. This is 
represented by the large green oval on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1 and it includes a 
more extensive list of the fundamental building blocks that underpin a secure, stable and 
peaceful society, including food and livelihood security, health care and social safety nets, 
access to justice, respect for human rights, shelter, and other positive values. 
 
On the left-hand side of Figure 3.1, the large red oval represents a classical, rather old-
fashioned vision of the state as a repository of legitimate power and authority, exercising a 
monopoly of force over a defined community and territory. Luckham (2015) points out that 
this Westphalian ideal does not describe modern states very completely or very well, for 
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several reasons. At the margins, state power is often limited or ineffective, and this is 
particularly visible in the case of so-called ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states, where the authority of 
central government is often ineffective or contested. At the same time, modern neo-liberal 
economic ideologies at national and international levels have led many states to cede direct 
control over the provision of functions and services that fell within the remit of many 
‘Western’ states during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and especially in the 
‘welfare states’ of the post-1945 period. Many states have delegated or sub-contracted 
responsibilities for delivering welfare and services, extending even to judicial, military and 
police powers, both within and beyond state borders. 
 
Non-state actors inhabiting this zone of devolved, compromised and contested state power 
include corporations, philanthropic and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), footloose 
investors and wealthy individuals, militias and paramilitary groups, organised crime and 
terrorist groups, and others. These non-state actors often exercise state-like powers, 
sometimes including effective control over territory, through which ordinary people 
experience security and insecurity, inclusion and exclusion. This penumbra of non-state and 
quasi-state actors are depicted in Figure 3.1 as the translucent, pale red circles around the 
edges of formal state power. 
 
Across the top of the diagram is a cloud of looming threats and challenges from which 
individuals and groups may require or seek protection. These include examples of natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, technological disasters such as nuclear power 
plant explosions, epidemics and infectious diseases, crime and violence, state collapse, 
technological change that affects livelihoods and changes employment prospects, and so 
on. 
 
Figure 3.1 includes a ‘top-down’ vs ‘bottom-up’, supply vs demand dynamic, although the 
‘top’ of this relationship (supply) is represented conceptually by the actors and structures on 
the left-hand side of the diagram, while the ‘bottom’ (demand) is represented by the green 
oval, representing a space populated by citizens and civil society, on the right. The white 
boxes depict the idea that security and inclusion are supposed to be supplied by the state 
and its agents, while these public goods are demanded by people and communities in 
society. People express their claim for security and inclusion in terms of rights and 
entitlements and through collective action, while the legitimacy of the state is supposed to 
rest partly on its ability to provide public goods including security and development. But 
‘security’ and ‘development’ are in inverted commas because they are contested concepts, 
and sometimes what the state supplies is a structure of systematic violence, exclusion and 
repression. 
 
Participants in our workshops pointed out that collective action implies more than organising 
to claim rights, lobby powerful actors or demand services from the state. It also 
encompasses many forms of social organisation and movements operating at local, national 
and transnational levels. People and communities are not only passive recipients of public 
services and goods but agents who often find ways to cope with insecure situations and 
create their own frameworks of security and inclusion. This is the realm of the non-state 
actors we often think of as non-governmental and civil society organisations (NGOs and 
CSOs). These may include neighbourhood, community, religious, traditional, professional 
and labour organisations and other forms of social solidarity, through which collective goods 
and services may be organised by people for themselves. 
 
These forms of grass-roots, non-state self-organisation can be seen as analogues of the 
non-state actors depicted on the fringes of state power on the left-hand side of the diagram, 
and it was argued during our workshops that this new set of non-state actors ought to be 
added to the figure as a cluster of translucent, pale green circles overlapping the ‘security in 
the vernacular’ zone on the right of the diagram. At the same time, however, participants 
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recognised that collective action and bottom-up self-organisation might not necessarily 
contribute benignly to security and inclusion in the vernacular sense. Grass-roots 
movements might also organise for violence and exclusion, leading to majoritarian populism, 
sectarianism, and the marginalisation of minorities. The absence of social solidarity or a 
failure to organise, perhaps due to personal experiences of alienation, exclusion or 
disempowerment, could impede the collective action needed to resist oppression or address 
shared problems or individual deprivation. Acts of resistance or rebellion could also be 
unorganised and unruly, challenging the state while creating both opportunities and risks for 
individual human security and empowerment. Through this discussion it became clear that 
the various kinds and categories of non-state actors in the system could not be assigned 
necessarily, exclusively or permanently to state or non-state spaces, or to positive or 
negative dynamics contributing to or undermining security and inclusion. 
 
Inclusion may be an ambiguous benefit for individuals and groups. Inclusion may occur 
involuntarily or on unfavourable terms (adverse inclusion), in ways that impose obligations 
and create dependencies that may not be beneficial to the individuals and groups 
concerned. Inclusion may also be on terms that create inequity in the treatment of individuals 
and groups, even if the outcomes are not actually negative for minorities or subaltern 
communities. The problematising of both ‘security’ and ‘inclusion’, as well as the relationship 
between them, turned out to be among the major insights emerging from this scenario study; 
this point will reappear below. 
 
Workshop participants felt that a huge range of factors have a bearing on human security 
and inclusion in the vernacular sense, including history, politics, law and justice, gender 
relations, urbanisation, the arms trade, electronic security and surveillance, migration, global 
governance structures, cultural and religious beliefs and ideologies, and many others. 
Traditional and social media organisations and networks were identified as important 
communication channels and mediators between state and citizens as well as social and 
economic actors in their own right, which are missing from the diagram. It was pointed out 
that the apparatuses of the state, for example, could be generators or providers of either 
security or insecurity for individuals. Moreover, individuals, groups and states are not 
discrete abstractions, they are real and concrete features of societies, whose characteristics 
are deeply embedded in and shaped by their mutual relationships and associations. Also, 
while we think of the state as representing a public space (e.g. republic, res publica), the 
apparatuses of the state may be (and often are) hijacked by and used to promote sectional 
or private interests. While it would undermine the clarifying purpose of the diagram if all 
these complexifying features were included, the fact that these considerations were brought 
to the surface during our discussions confirms that the diagram was successful in stimulating 
the workshop participants’ thinking, thus helping to prepare for the scenario-building phase 
of the process. 
3.2  Accelerating sustainability 
To explore the dynamics of sustainability and unsustainability we used the Evidence Report 
by Schmitz and Scoones (2015) as our resource. This document contains a clearer, rather 
more normative programme of action than the other two source documents we used for this 
project. Figure 3.2 depicts the process and route by which the authors argue that humanity 
may reach a safe space that is ecologically sustainable as well as socially just and inclusive. 
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Figure 3.2 Programme theory on drivers of (un)sustainability 
 
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Schmitz and Scoones (2015). 
 
According to Schmitz and Scoones (2015), a socially just and green transformation of 
human society is likely to require collaborations among actors with different capacities and 
interests, including social movements and civil society groups, private sector organisations, 
and states. Progressive alliances may contribute to transformational change towards 
greener and socially just futures; alternatively, alliances may be resistive and attempt to 
defend the status quo or promote narrow or short-term interests, holding back progress 
towards a sustainable future. These alternative pathways are represented by the blue and 
red arrows, respectively, in Figure 3.2. The large blue arrow thrusting from left to right across 
the centre of the diagram represents a progressive pathway towards greater sustainability 
and social justice, while the smaller red arrow represents an unsustainable continuation of 
‘business as usual’. The arrows end in a sustainable and socially just future on one hand, or 
climate crisis on the other. 
 
We emphasised that these arrows should not be taken to represent singular pathways, since 
many different kinds of alliances, across diverse sectors and locations, may create various 
alternative pathways with varying degrees of potential to contribute to a sustainable 
transformation (or not). Note also that the pathways should be understood to have multiple 
dimensions including political, social and technical. Pathways leading to green 
transformations are expected to involve substantive technological and socioeconomic 
transformations in order to arrive at a socially just and ecologically sustainable ‘safe space 
for humanity’. 
 
Alliances may be formed between actors whose interests are not completely aligned 
including, for example, entities for which green transformations and environmental 
sustainability are not individual priorities but where the alliance might provide co-benefits, 
such as profits, portfolio diversification, enhanced competitiveness, innovation, job creation, 
and so on. Resistive alliances may include not only market incumbents and other vested 
interests but also workers in polluting industries whose jobs are at risk, citizens whose 
pensions are invested in dirty energy, and so on.  
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A crude generalisation portrayed in the diagram is the interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up dynamics, represented by the two black arrows. This stimulated considerable 
discussion about the potential for movements of change or resistance at global, regional, 
national and local scales. Arguably, in order to reach a safe space for humanity, not only 
governments and industry/market incumbents need to be involved but also civil society 
groups, social entrepreneurs and small start-up companies. Top-down, directive, 
technocratic solutions are probably not sufficient on their own. Disruptive socio-technical 
change may emerge more easily from actors on the fringes rather than from incumbents, 
who benefit from the status quo. 
 
The diagram in Figure 3.2 is not confined to a particular sector, context or scale. It can be 
applied to large global transformations or to city- and neighbourhood-level socio-technical 
change, and it may be applied equally to food or energy systems, mobility solutions, 
housing, sanitation, and so on. Participants pointed out that the specific situation and context 
matters, however. In what particular settings and sectors could and would these alliances 
and pathways be found to emerge and develop? 
 
During our workshops it was noted that the diagram omits nature as an agent, although bio-, 
geo-, physical and chemical processes are playing vital roles in shaping the future climate 
and determining the safe space for humanity. The emerging effects of climate change may 
provide humanity with increasingly urgent incentives to change behaviour. The diagram also 
compresses many details, for example the detailed characteristics of a safe space for 
humanity are not explored. Participants argued that questions should be asked about the 
meaning of sustainability, and for whom. Participants noted that the definition of 
sustainability has not always included social dimensions, and the concept will probably 
continue to evolve. The diagram also reifies a simplistic contrast between the two extremes 
of irreversible climate change and a just, green and social safe space for humanity. Overall, 
progress towards sustainability is likely to be complex, ambiguous and incremental; the 
movement towards bio-fuels was given as an example of a technological development with 
ambiguous implications for social and ecological sustainability. Participants also noted that 
an advance towards sustainability in one arena, such as a new energy technology, could 
change the potential for further advances to occur following on, and also that there could be 
steps backward as well as forward. It was argued that the diagram ought to include some 
feedback effects of this kind. The diagram also says nothing about the speed and timescale 
required to transform different sectors or achieve impact at different scales. Despite giving 
the impression of a dynamic progression, the diagram really lacks any sense of historical 
context, which some participants felt was an important factor underpinning sector- and 
region-specific opportunities for change in the present and the immediate future. For 
example, it was asked whether, as a matter of historical fact, sustainability is better 
understood as a condition towards which humanity is heading or an original condition from 
which we have moved decisively away. 
 
Participants in the workshops also queried the depiction of state, market and citizen spaces 
as distinct units. Some felt that citizens were the key actors, who engage with one another 
quite fluidly across civil society, commerce and public arenas. The classification of alliances 
into transformative and resistive groups was also considered too binary. In reality it might be 
difficult to assign alliances clearly to transformative or resistive categories; the diagram also 
omits the turbulence, conflict and politics of knowledge that may exist within and between 
alliances, and the potential that alliances might change in composition and strategy as 
circumstances changed. Some participants also questioned the use of the term ‘resistance’ 
only for alliances seeking to prevent change; they argued that resistance could also be 
applied correctly to activities that seek to undermine incumbent industries and destabilise 
established regimes in order to bring about change. 
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Participants anticipated the scenario exercise when they noted that progress towards 
ecological sustainability might not be accompanied by justice or inclusion, for example the 
sustainability agenda could be driven from above in a technocratic style, with the result being 
not necessarily equitable or just. Similarly, it was noted that there is a tension between the 
value of stability, which may be regarded as a desirable feature associated with human 
security (see Section 3.1), and the idea of transformation, which implies disrupting and 
subverting the status quo. For this reason, one participant proposed that resilience was a 
more appropriate goal than stability. 
3.3  Reducing inequality 
Our source for the programme theory on drivers of equality and inequality was the report by 
Justino and Moore (2015). Our summary of the mechanisms and drivers outlined in this 
report, which determine the distribution of wealth, incomes and other resources, is depicted 
in Figure 3.3. The diagram and the underlying ideas were presented and discussed, 
alongside the other two diagrams, during all three workshops. 
Figure 3.3 Programme theory on drivers of (in)equality 
 
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Justino and Moore (2015). 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts various mechanisms, processes and structures that determine the 
distribution of assets and resources within a set of nested scales. The diagram can be read 
from left to right as a descent through a series of steps from the global scale down to the 
scale of households and individuals. Within each scale mechanisms and drivers are listed 
which shape the distribution of assets and resources across societies. The pale circle on the 
right-hand side of the diagram represents outcomes for individuals and groups, and here are 
listed some major aspects of the distribution of both real assets and intangible resources 
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(such as power and opportunities) which collectively are determined by the many factors 
listed within the nested hierarchy of scales depicted in the diagram. 
 
The diagram has an algorithmic quality, like a calculating engine. Either negative or positive 
outcomes (‘outputs’) may be produced on the right-hand side (that is, lesser or greater 
equality), depending on what ‘settings’ are given to the various factors and mechanisms 
shown in the diagram (the ‘inputs’), as well as their dynamics and interaction. An alternative 
way of phrasing this is to liken the factors in the nested scales of the diagram to many 
independent variables that influence the outcomes, i.e. the dependent variables, which are 
produced in the pale blue circle on the right-hand side. In principle, empirical data could be 
gathered relating to each of the points listed in the diagram, regardless of the particular 
setting or context, and inserted into this framework as a means to assess how assets, 
resources, rights and opportunities are distributed to different communities, social groups, 
and individuals in that setting. In that sense, the framework has a mechanical quality rather 
than a normative, value-laden tendency towards a particular outcome. In other words, the 
structural properties of the diagram do not determine that outcomes must necessarily tend 
towards greater equality or inequality; the outcomes found in a given situation will depend on 
the distributional characteristics and mechanisms operating in that particular case. By 
focusing on structures rather than processes, the diagram lacks a clear normative 
programme for reducing inequalities. (Some participants in the workshops argued that our 
interpretation overlooked a more normative section of the source document, which discusses 
potential policies and interventions to create greater equality (Justino and Moore 2015:     
22–24)). 
 
Thanks to its structural quality, the framework depicted in Figure 3.3 might be used in 
principle as a sort of checklist or system diagram, which would help to identify points and 
scales where interventions (e.g. policies or investments) might affect (in)equality, positively 
or negatively. For example, if one wanted to investigate or influence the gender distribution 
of wealth in a given society or community, a diagram like the one in Figure 3.3 could be used 
to help identify the many structures and mechanisms at global, national, community and 
household scales that help to determine men’s and women’s access to property, income, 
wealth, education, justice, and so on, within that particular setting. Alternatively, as one 
participant suggested, a diagram like this one might guide researchers in an investigation of 
the factors that contributed to historical successes in reducing inequality in particular places 
and times, such as Latin America (2002–15), South Korea (1960–90), or Malaysia (1969–
95). In theory if not in practice, coefficients might be estimated for each of the independent 
variables listed, which would make it possible to identify which factors were having the 
greatest effects on (in)equality. Policymakers and programme designers could then use this 
information to identify the most effective and promising places to intervene. The particular 
factors that might be most salient in one context might be different in another setting, and the 
outcomes for different stakeholders, such as men and women, or people in different 
locations, would also be different. 
 
The mechanical and algorithmic character of the diagram de-emphasises temporality, 
including the specific historical processes that have led to the substantial inequality observed 
in our world today. These processes, which in fact are highlighted in the source document 
(Justino and Moore 2015), appear in the diagram only allusively and at the largest, global 
and national scales, where reference is made to historical contexts such as colonial 
legacies, the creation of welfare states and the Washington Consensus. Several participants 
complained that power was an invisible dimension of the diagram, both as an aspect of and 
a major cause of inequality. 
 
The stacked layers of the diagram are also less good at depicting the dynamic processes 
and interactions among factors within and between scales, including feedback loops and 
recursive processes that mutually support one another to amplify and reinforce the unequal 
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distributions of wealth and power that we observe in the world today. Some participants 
complained therefore that the diagram lacks a political economy dimension. For similar 
reasons the diagram does not offer guidance to help distinguish causes from consequences 
of inequality; nor does it tell the reader how the different factors might be valued and 
prioritised by different individuals, such as elites and subaltern groups. Participants in our 
workshops pointed out that scholars from different disciplines might hold different views on 
the priority to be given to different kinds of inequality. For example, some participants opined 
that the diagram emphasises material inequality (unequal distribution of income, wealth, and 
natural resources) and neglects inequalities in the social, care and reproductive economies. 
The diagram also ignores the technical distinction drawn in academic literature between 
vertical inequality (among households or individuals) and horizontal inequality (among social 
groups sharing a common characteristic, e.g. gender or ethnic groups). Some participants 
objected that the diagram emphasises a nested hierarchy of scales and argued that 
alternative heuristics might be better at explaining how inequality is created, such as 
pathways. 
 
It was suggested that the pale circle should include the distribution of opportunities such as 
access to markets. Also, there are well-known differences between political traditions (e.g. 
liberal vs socialist) with regard to the priority they give to equality of opportunities or equality 
of outcomes, but the diagram ignores this debate and perhaps implicitly favours the socialist 
emphasis on equality of outcomes (i.e. the pale blue circle). Several participants suggested 
measures that could be added to the pale circle, such as access to social protection. Finally, 
it was pointed out that the different types of inequality may be tackled and are being tackled 
using different strategies, but without joined-up thinking it was possible for these efforts to 
conflict with or undermine one another. This observation was a helpful prelude to the 
deliberations in the next phase of the workshop. 
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4 Scenario development and wind-tunnelling 
 
After the discussion of the programme theory diagrams, the workshops moved into the 
scenario-building phase. This phase had two parts, as explained in Section 2 of this report. 
In the first phase, the workshop participants were asked to begin the scenario development 
process by focusing initially on negative interactions among the three themes under 
consideration, of the kind discussed in Section 2.2 (see Glover et al. 2016). These 
exploratory and somewhat ‘dystopian’ scenarios are presented in Annexe A. We observed 
that some of the participants found this phase of the workshop rather uncomfortable, since 
the process obliged them to consider outcomes that were unpleasant or difficult to 
contemplate. Thankfully, the participants demonstrated their willingness to place their trust in 
the process and they engaged with the constraints we imposed on them. A certain dark 
humour was evident in some of the scenarios as the participants considered how positive 
outcomes in some aspects of development might be accompanied by negative features. 
 
Once the participants had completed this phase of the process, in which they focused on 
negative interactions and tensions between pairs of goals (such as a scenario of high 
inequality with sustainability), we asked them to build integrated scenarios that would 
accommodate interactions among all three of the themes in which we are interested, paying 
special attention to the factors or measures that might help humanity to steer towards 
scenarios where positive outcomes could be envisaged in all three domains. These 
integrated scenarios are presented in Annexe B. During this phase of the workshop, we 
noticed a strong utopian, idealistic tendency emerging in the scenarios, leading us to wonder 
whether the scenarios met the test of plausibility. We interpret this turn of the process in two 
ways. First, it may be a symptom of the participants’ urge to recover a positive spirit after we 
had insisted that they had to consider potential negative outcomes in the previous stage. 
Participants were evidently relieved to be able to tell more positive stories and we observed 
a new cheerfulness as group members ‘rebounded’ from the dystopian scenarios they had 
discussed during the previous step of the process. Second, this step of the workshop 
process was designed to move our discussion in a more aspirational direction. People had in 
mind the challenge of how to achieve human development that would be more inclusive, 
secure, egalitarian and sustainable. This gave participants the opportunity to sketch out the 
kind of world they would like to see in 30 years’ time. Our hope was that they would do so 
while bearing in mind the need to construct a plausible pathway towards this destination, as 
well as the pitfalls and challenges that were highlighted in the previous, dystopian scenarios. 
As can be seen from the rather utopian character of some of the integrated scenarios in 
Annexe B, this expectation was not completely met. However, participants did succeed in 
fleshing out a picture of the sustainable, equitable, secure and inclusive societies that 
development should aspire to achieve, which helped to illustrate how different values and 
goals might be connected and integrated. 
 
The scenarios themselves are less important as finished products than as resource and 
stimulus for reflection and discussion about the issues and questions they raise. This is why 
we present the scenarios separately, in annexes. In the next section, we discuss the insights 
we recorded during and after the workshop deliberations, including the discussions around 
the programme theory diagrams, the two phases of scenario building, and the wind-
tunnelling analysis in which the workshop participants considered the policies and strategies 
needed to guide human development towards the triple-positive ‘blue zone’ depicted in 
Figure 2.1. 
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5 Discussion 
 
Overall, the scenario-building processes in each of the three workshops were quite 
successful in drawing out a range of key issues, dilemmas, challenges and opportunities for 
integrating the competing development goals of accelerating sustainability, reducing 
inequality and building secure and inclusive societies. The eventual scenarios had a utopian 
flavour and were disappointingly thin in terms of describing plausible pathways by which 
such happy outcomes might be achieved. Nonetheless, the process of discussion and 
deliberation that was used to develop the scenarios proved to be remarkably effective in 
teasing out some of the ways in which positive outcomes might be achievable independently 
or in concert, how they might support one another and in what respects they might be in 
tension with each other. In this section we highlight the key insights that emerged from the 
workshop deliberations with respect to these interactions and their implications for 
international development research, policy and practice in the coming years. 
5.1  Unpacking the three themes 
Our scenario discussions reminded all participants that it is important to adopt clear and 
useful, and ideally shared, working definitions of key terms of interest, such as ‘secure and 
inclusive societies’, ‘inequalities’ and ‘sustainability’ in the present case. The workshop 
deliberations brought to the surface a number of difficulties and potential ambiguities relating 
to the interpretation of each of these terms, as well as the risks involved in certain ways of 
understanding what they could mean and how they could be fulfilled. In the following 
paragraphs, we discuss how the meanings of the three themes of interest may be 
‘unpacked’. 
5.1.1 Unpacking ‘security and inclusion’ 
The aspiration to build secure and inclusive societies implies that security and inclusion go 
naturally together and buttress one another. However, security and inclusion are distinct 
values with different implications. It seems trite to observe that social exclusion is 
disadvantageous and may be associated with insecurity, but citizens may also be included in 
political and socioeconomic structures involuntarily or unwillingly, or on adverse terms. For 
example, individuals may acquire obligations such as taxation or military service, yet not 
reap the rewards of social inclusion on equal terms with other members of society. In 
extreme cases, the inclusion of marginalised groups or minorities may operate more to the 
advantage of others than for their own benefit. This is a key reason why Luckham (2015) 
enjoins us to interpret ‘security’ as entailing much more than keeping control over force and 
protecting individuals from physical violence. ‘Security in the vernacular’ implies a model of 
social inclusion that provides each individual with the tangible benefits of engagement in a 
wider collective, including security of food and shelter, access to resources and services, 
protection of essential rights, and opportunities to participate in society. 
5.1.2 Unpacking ‘sustainability’ 
The workshop discussions confirmed the importance of recognising ‘sustainability’ as a very 
complex concept even if one considers only its biophysical or ecological aspects. 
Environmental sustainability encompasses a wide range of different dimensions, including 
greenhouse gas emissions and their relationship to global warming, climate change and 
extreme weather; biodiversity loss and species extinction in agriculture and ‘natural’ spaces; 
air and water pollution and soil erosion; the production, distribution and consumption of 
energy, information, products and services, and so on. Surrounding all these and intimately 
connected with them are diverse social, economic, political and technological issues, varying 
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in intensity across spatial and temporal scales and influencing development pathways 
through feedback loops, recursion, lock-in and other mechanisms. This makes it extremely 
hard to envisage how sustainability might be achieved in the future and it highlights the 
importance of attending to complex interactions, unintended consequences, and unknown 
variables. 
5.1.3 Unpacking ‘(in)equality’ 
Compared to the complexity found within the other two themes, the development goal of 
reducing inequalities seems much simpler. The tension between giving priority to (in)equality 
of opportunities or to (in)equality of outcomes is a widely appreciated and well-rehearsed 
topic in political and philosophical debates. An alternative way of framing this dilemma is to 
distinguish equality as procedural fairness from equality as substantive equity of treatment. A 
perennial question is when fairness requires or allows unequal treatment, for example when 
an objective difference in the capacities or needs of an individual or group demands special 
and differential treatment compared to others who have greater capacities or less pressing 
needs. The conceptual difference between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ (in)equalities is perhaps 
less widely discussed outside specialist circles, yet the distinction matters keenly to efforts to 
reduce gender inequality, for example. All of these kinds of (in)equality came up during our 
workshop deliberations and in the scenarios. In particular, some participants emphasised 
that (in)equality could be either (or both) cause and consequence of poverty, deprivation, 
social exclusion, etc. These complexities within the concepts of equality and inequality are 
connected to all the problems of international development and are certainly implicated in 
both ‘building secure and inclusive societies’ and ‘accelerating sustainability’. 
5.2  Exploring interactions among pairs of themes 
5.2.1 Sustainability with equality 
The relationship between equality and sustainability was prominent in some of the workshop 
discussions and cropped up in different guises in the scenarios that emerged. Participants 
expressed the widely shared anxiety that if economic equality is achieved at the levels of 
wealth and consumption that are current in affluent countries, then the environmental 
impacts will be severe – essentially making ecologically sustainable development impossible 
to achieve. Two alternatives to this negative pathway were explored during the scenario 
exercises. One option would be for economic equality to stabilise at a level of wealth and 
consumption much lower than the one currently enjoyed by the human beings with the 
largest environmental footprints. This would be politically contentious and would likely face 
resistance from richer people faced with a reduction in their living standards, unless an ethic 
of transnational solidarity were to emerge or if a majority among the wealthier citizens of 
Earth were to become so convinced of the need to curb their appetites that they would be 
willing to make personal sacrifices for the greater good. In one of the scenarios a transition 
of behaviour and values along these lines was a key plank. Is this realistic and plausible? 
Values can and do change, and sometimes values such as altruism and solidarity may 
defeat selfishness and chauvinism, yet some human instincts and cultural norms are deeply 
engrained and unlikely to disappear. 
 
Another pathway might emerge if new technologies make it possible to sustain elevated 
standards of living for a greater human population while stabilising or reducing pressure on 
the environment. This hopeful prospect was embraced in some of the scenarios. Workshop 
participants envisaged that such a transition might be achieved with new renewable energy 
technologies and through much more efficient use of natural resources in a ‘circular 
economy’ or a ‘sharing economy’. Importantly, these transitions would involve social 
(organisational and behavioural) change as well as technological advances. There are signs 
of technological and commercial developments along all these lines, so perhaps these 
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transformations are plausible; however, will they be substantial enough to raise the living 
standards of billions of poor people without putting impossible strain on the environment? 
And will the redistributive effects of these technologies, in terms of political power, inclusion, 
voice, human rights and control over resources be equitable (horizontally and/or vertically) 
and also socially just? 
 
Another important note that emerged from the scenario workshops was the concern that 
ecological sustainability might be achieved in ways that would not be socially just, inclusive 
or egalitarian. For example, political, economic or military power might be deployed to 
impose austere livelihoods on a mass of the population while elites enjoyed high levels of 
consumption. In this inegalitarian manner, greenhouse gas emissions might be reduced and 
climate change avoided at the cost of undermining justice, social solidarity and human 
security for many people. Some participants in our workshops wondered if environmentally 
sustainable practices would be easier and quicker to implement if they were imposed in a 
top-down manner, and of course political and moral leadership may play positive roles. 
However, many participants in our workshops felt that any pathway that involved serious and 
visible inequality would not be sustainable in the long run because people would be unwilling 
to submit to such an unfair regime. 
 
It was also pointed out that tackling economic and social inequality could be a means of 
accelerating sustainable development. Inequality and poverty contribute to unsustainable 
behaviour by individuals, communities and organisations, through complex mechanisms 
ranging from short-term resource depletion caused by poor people who are unable to take a 
long-term perspective, to status anxiety among richer people who feel driven to consume 
more. On the other hand, when people feel less poor and more secure about the future they 
are inclined to preserve resources; similarly, social safety nets and the empowerment of 
women are known to have driven down birth rates worldwide, which have been the keys to 
reducing unsustainable population growth in recent decades. A key challenge for 
development policy, research and practice in the coming years will be to understand how to 
achieve a balance between equality and sustainability and how to carefully sequence 
interventions that may change the relationship between them. 
 
Finally, our workshop discussions affirmed that different kinds of equalities or inequalities 
may interact with sustainability in different ways, for example horizontal inequalities could 
have different implications for sustainability than vertical inequalities; and (in)equalities of 
opportunity might be connected to sustainability differently from (in)equalities of status or 
outcomes. Similarly, inequalities in different dimensions, such as wealth, resources, political 
and economic power, voice, and so on, might be connected to sustainable development in 
contrasting ways, and each interaction merits specific consideration. 
5.2.2 Sustainability with human security and inclusion 
Some participants in our workshops averred that human security and inclusive development 
often are, could or should be given a higher priority than sustainability. This can be 
interpreted as a pragmatic or realist argument, based on a premise that survival and the right 
to existence are basic requirements before values such as sustainability (or equity) can rise 
to the top of the development priority list. Some political theorists would argue that economic 
stability and secure livelihoods need to be achieved before people’s attention can or should 
turn to higher questions, such as ecological sustainability. Similarly, some economists would 
argue that the wealth generated by economic growth in the short and medium terms will 
eventually supply the resources needed to finance conservation and environmental 
rehabilitation, as well as the technological innovation needed to achieve higher standards of 
living based on relatively or absolutely smaller ecological footprints. Of course, such an 
argument can also be labelled risky and short-termist, since environmental harms inflicted 
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today may be irreversible, or may substantially impair the ability of future generations to 
survive and thrive in their turn. 
 
During the development of the scenarios, our workshop participants explored the possibility 
that strategies to achieve ecologically sustainable development could be imposed from the 
top in undemocratic ways based on mechanisms of control, regulation, surveillance and 
punishment. Such an arrangement might even be regarded as legitimate and might be 
tolerated if it delivered basic needs for the population such as shelter, food and livelihood 
security, and economic stability. A top-down strategy for achieving ecologically sustainable 
development might meet the criteria of ‘secure and inclusive’ but fail to deliver human 
development based on a richer conceptualisation of human and livelihood security ‘in the 
vernacular’. 
 
The alternative vision of a kind of sustainable development from the ‘bottom up’, which is 
‘just’ and ‘social’ as well as ‘green’, seems to imply a looser, less controlling kind of strategy 
that mobilises the creativity of diverse actors and facilitates the free participation of citizens 
and communities. However, governments and other authorities may be reluctant, indeed 
fearful of ceding control and distributing power in this way, moves that may make it appear 
more difficult to ensure that environmental problems are confronted in a coherent and 
effective manner. In other words, societies will want to be confident that opening up a 
diverse array of innovation pathways will create more effective and quicker routes to 
sustainable development transformations than trying to impose sustainable development 
through managerial interventions from above. They might need to be convinced that 
development pathways that are socially just and inclusive are also likely to be more 
sustainable in ecological terms, or to achieve sustainable development progress more 
quickly and with greater certainty. This implies that a significant challenge for development 
researchers as well as practitioners will be to persuade policymakers and voters that 
environmental sustainability and social justice can be pursued together – and explain how 
this can be done. 
 
An interesting strand of the workshop discussions focused on stability and its relationship to 
innovation. It is reasonable to identify stability – of the economy, of employment, of human 
relationships, and so on – as a key component of human security and social inclusion; 
however, too much stability can be stultifying and oppressive. Instability creates 
opportunities to bring about change (whether positive or negative); moreover, positive 
change requires the disruption of the status quo. Achieving social and technological 
transformations that lead to greater sustainability will require innovations that destabilise 
existing institutional and cultural frameworks, norms and practices. Even state collapse may 
eventually create opportunities for something better to be created. Yet severe or prolonged 
instability can be chaotic, creating situations of acute insecurity that encourage very short-
term thinking and promote powerfully unsustainable practices, such as resource depletion 
and hoarding of productive resources. If societies are to deliver human security as well as 
more sustainable ways of life, then a key challenge is to achieve a productive balance 
between stability and change, between security and opportunity. This may be among the 
reasons why concepts such as resilience have come to the forefront of some discussions 
about sustainable development and adaptation to climate change, for example. 
5.2.3 Equality with human security and inclusion 
The relationship between equality and social inclusion formed another interesting strand of 
the workshop discussions and scenario-building processes. In a certain sense, social 
exclusion is incompatible with equality, since by definition it requires unequal treatment of 
the included and excluded. As some of the scenarios illustrated, it is possible to imagine 
societies in which a mass of citizens share fairly equally in deprivation, while a much smaller 
elite enjoys much higher standards of living (which might be relatively equal when compared 
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across the elite stratum). We could not honestly call this equality, and therefore social 
inclusion seems to be a pre-requisite of equal treatment. Yet, inclusion is not sufficient to 
guarantee either procedural or substantial equality. The point is important because all of us 
are born into an existing social framework we cannot choose; just as refugees, for example, 
may be obliged to accept the rules and norms of an alien society because their survival 
depends on it. 
 
In addition to being involuntary, inclusion in society may be unwilling. For example, nomadic 
pastoralists and itinerant peoples such as Roma resist incorporation into nation states, yet 
because their itineraries overlap with the fixed territories and settled populations of states 
they may find themselves included in society in certain concrete ways, and obliged (even by 
force) to assume particular duties and responsibilities towards the state, sometimes on 
adverse terms of unequal and unfair treatment. The negative connotations of social inclusion 
are sometimes overlooked in development interventions, as one of our workshop 
participants observed in programmes that aim to promote financial inclusion, where people 
facing huge economic disadvantages may be exposed to market risks of which they have 
little understanding and over which they have no control. In these examples, the insistence 
on treating all people equally – that is, including everyone in regimes of equal treatment – 
may produce outcomes of substantial or procedural unfairness, and a reduction in human 
freedom. 
 
The workshop discussions affirmed that the relationship between (in)equality and (in)security 
is dynamic and reflexive. Our scenario-builders assumed that a more equal world is 
unattainable in a context of widespread insecurity (including in the vernacular sense) 
because the most powerful people in society are readily able to obtain greater security for 
themselves (at least in the formal, classic sense of security), even at the expense of others. 
The appearance of gated communities in highly unequal societies seems to authenticate 
these fears. Some of the dystopian scenarios illustrated the fact that this kind of security (in 
the formal sense) can be used by the powerful to sustain conditions of social and economic 
inequality, which in turn implies a substantial undermining of human security for many 
people, in the vernacular sense of the term. On the other hand, while the provision of the 
basic conditions of human security for all citizens on an equal basis is an egalitarian principle 
in its own right, it also underpins the freedom of individuals and groups to pursue 
opportunities on equal terms. Through such means they may be able to advance their 
wealth, status or power compared to others in society and, over time, this may entrench 
substantial inequality that cascades through generations. But inequality itself may undermine 
security by fostering dissatisfaction and resentment against the status quo and the groups or 
individuals that benefit from it. These sentiments may create stresses that progressively 
undermine social cohesion, ultimately jeopardising security in both classic and vernacular 
senses. 
 
The intricacy, reflexivity and dynamism of the relationships that connect human security, 
social inclusion and different kinds of equality suggest that there is a ‘sweet spot’ in which 
security promotes rather than undermines equality and where inclusion is positive and 
empowering rather than oppressive. This requires that security is understood not only in the 
classic sense of protection from violence or oppression, but also in the richer, vernacular 
sense of everyday human security, which safeguards individual rights, provides essential 
services and underpins the basic freedoms that promote equality of opportunity and freedom 
of expression. It also implies that social inclusion should be willing even if it is literally 
involuntary; in other words incorporation into society should be recognised as legitimate and 
beneficial to all citizens. Ultimately, for social inclusion to be literally voluntary and 
consensual the possibility would have to exist for citizens to withdraw from society, which 
would mean being willing to give up its benefits as well as its obligations. 
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5.2.4 Threefold integration: A socially and ecologically sustainable, more 
equal, secure and inclusive world 
Work towards understanding the interconnections among the three themes discussed in this 
document is ongoing within IDS. This report is a contribution to that effort and a stepping 
stone in a wider process. Overall, our workshop discussions and scenario-building 
deliberations affirmed that a positive integration of the three key goals of reducing 
inequalities, accelerating sustainability, and building secure and inclusive societies can be 
achieved but it will not be a simple or straightforward process. For example, finding a good 
balance between competing positive values that are in tension with each other, such as 
stability and innovation, will be key to achieving a rapid transition to a green, inclusive and 
equitable society. Protecting essential values such as participation and fairness may 
sometimes be difficult to reconcile with the urgent need to introduce new technologies and 
change behaviours to drive down greenhouse gas emissions. One lesson to draw from our 
deliberations is the importance of having good working definitions of key terms such as 
sustainability and security, being clear about what we understand by these slogans, and 
being reflexive about their underlying values whenever we seek to implement change. 
 
Our scenario-building discussions suggest that, in order to address these integrated 
challenges, development scholars, practitioners and policymakers will need to be creative 
and ready to adopt new tools and methods that can help them design, implement and 
monitor development interventions that take into account more than one dimension at a time. 
An example of such a tool was the radar chart proposed by one workshop participant, in 
which the interaction among scales of sustainability, equality, human security and inclusion 
could be depicted in a common framework, providing a means of thinking about how to 
influence the ‘shape’ of the ‘safe space’ for humanity. Tools of this kind could be used to 
encourage decision-makers and citizens to approach development challenges such as the 
SDGs in an integrated rather than a fragmented, piecemeal way. As ever, it is important to 
understand the nature of the challenge one faces; but understanding the challenge is only 
the first step. 
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6 Post-script: The implications of Brexit for 
the UK and international development 
 
Our scenario workshops were conducted in the first week of January 2016, months before 
the United Kingdom’s referendum on the country’s future relationship with the European 
Union. The narrow victory for ‘Brexit’ – to leave the EU – has major implications for the UK, 
EU and potentially for the world as a whole, including for international development 
cooperation. Neither the referendum nor any of these outcomes were on the radar of our 
workshop participants in January 2016. This reflects the degree to which the referendum 
result was unexpected by many stakeholders including many business leaders, members of 
the professions, and academic researchers. 
 
The implications of Brexit – whatever Brexit may eventually mean in practice – for 
international development are hard to fathom, but they could be significant. It remains to be 
seen whether the new UK government will sustain the country’s commitment to development 
cooperation, and if so how its size, distribution and delivery might be changed. These effects 
of Brexit on international development could have implications beyond UK government policy 
as well, because the UK has been a major provider of European international aid and 
development resources as well as exerting a strong influence over the aid and development 
strategies of the EU. 
 
This uncertain situation makes the deliberations and outcomes of our scenario workshops 
even more pertinent. As discussed in the previous section, instability creates great risks as 
well as new opportunities. A state of flux may open up new possibilities, novel options and 
alternative pathways that would have been hard to contemplate before, but whether these 
pathways will be made positive rather than negative for sustainable international 
development is a challenge that remains to be seized. Under these circumstances, the 
overarching framework provided by the SDG agenda may provide an opportunity to avoid 
the risk of an inward turn by the UK. This is because the SDGs have been framed as a 
horizontal, symmetrical development challenge facing the affluent countries of the ‘global 
North’ as well as the low-income countries of the ‘global South’. If a post-Brexit UK remains 
true to its commitment to the SDGs domestically as well as internationally, and especially if it 
retains its commitment to spending on international aid, it must address the challenges of 
sustainable development as an integral part of its new economic, diplomatic and 
international cooperation relationships. Development academics and practitioners in the UK 
(together with our friends and collaborators abroad) need to consider whether Brexit makes 
it harder or easier to build a transformation to a green, just and social economy in the UK 
and in low-income countries supported by the UK and EU. Above all, we need to work hard 
to ensure that the destabilisation of existing frameworks of power and governance will not 
create insecurity and exclusion for vulnerable people, but will be used to create better 
outcomes for individuals and communities in the UK and overseas. 
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Annexe A Exploratory ‘dystopian’ scenarios: 
Focusing on trade-offs and negative 
interactions 
 
In this Annexe we present concise versions of the exploratory, ‘dystopian’ scenarios 
developed by the workshop participants. Note that these scenarios were developed very 
rapidly and roughly, with the aim of exploring how a negative outcome in relation to the 
primary theme under consideration in each of the respective workshops could be associated 
with positive outcomes for the other two themes. The goal was only to oblige participants to 
confront the possibility that their personal or professional priorities might fail to be achieved 
even while advances might be made in other areas of development. 
 
According to the process design, six of these exploratory scenarios should have been 
developed, however, in the first workshop (focusing on building secure and inclusive 
societies), due to sickness and scheduling problems, we had too few participants to develop 
two separate dystopian scenarios. Instead we asked the participants to focus on the 
interaction between (in)security and in/exclusion and both (in)equality and (un)sustainability 
simultaneously (exploratory scenario 1). This meant that only one dystopian scenario was 
created in this workshop, and this also had knock-on implications for the next step in the 
scenario-building process, which was intended to involve integrating the three themes in a 
single scenario (see Annexe B). 
Exploratory scenario 1: An insecure and exclusionary but 
sustainable and equal world 
This single scenario was developed during the workshop that focused on the theme of 
building secure and inclusive societies. In this workshop, a shortage of participants made it 
undesirable to develop two separate ‘dystopian’ scenarios, each dealing separately with the 
negative interaction between insecurity/exclusion on one hand and either sustainability or 
equality on the other. Instead, the participants were asked to address both interactions at the 
same time. The resulting scenario is summarised in the following paragraphs. 
 
In 2020, a large Middle Eastern (West Asian) war erupted, which led to the destruction of the 
existing world order of nation states and the emergence of a wealthy and powerful group of 
plutocratic, technicist eco-zealots who eventually manage to seize control. By 2045, global 
sustainability has been accelerated at the cost of all other values. The ruling class has 
determined that fossil fuel use brought humanity close to destruction, and they justify the use 
of force to maintain an economic and social order in the name of maintaining an ecologically 
sustainable safe space for humanity. In this sustainable but undemocratic and non-
participatory world, there is a strong international order that faces some pockets of 
resistance. In place of democratic decision-making, the rulers have established an eco-
capitalist religion for a post-growth era (emerging from the idea of Gaia), in which a high 
priesthood has declared ecological unsustainability to be a mortal sin; anybody who 
threatens ecological sustainability may be eliminated. Although the religion has been 
imposed from above, most people have learned to follow the new doctrine. The global eco-
religion comprises numerous denominations (franchises), each one sponsored and run by a 
major multinational company. These corporate religious factions compete with one another 
for adherents, territory and resources, often through cyber-attacks on infrastructure as well 
as physical violence. City-regions around the world have become charter cities governed by 
their sponsoring corporations and affiliated with the companies’ religious sects; for example, 
New York City has evolved from The Big Apple into Apple City, sponsored by Apple Inc. 
Cities pay tithes to their corporate rulers. There is a very large underclass in which the great 
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majority of people are equally poor and deprived. The best jobs are in technology, 
surveillance, government and the official media organisations. 
 
The power of the eco-religious movements is sustained by control over technologies 
including new energy-generation systems, surveillance and control technologies, robots, 
drones and advanced weapon systems. These help the elites to monitor and control the 
masses. Intellectual property rights are highly exclusive and rigorously enforced; pirating 
technology is another mortal sin and anyone stealing technology may be lawfully executed. 
Economic growth continues to be a prime value. A small middle class exists, creating a 
model that many from the underclass aspire to join. Middle-class employment includes 
media jobs that promote the new religion, government, and policing the environment.  
 
The charter cities are pockets of peace in an unstable and sometimes violent world. Some 
blocs of countries as well as groups of dissenters persist, which refuse to give up their 
freedoms to the plutocrats. These include some oil-rich nations that continue to exploit fossil 
fuels to underpin a progressive tax system and welfare states; some popular social 
movements of financially excluded people; some mafia-like anti-ecology criminal networks; 
some disaffected youths including a widespread, retro ‘Diesel punk’ movement that 
celebrates hydrocarbon energy; and underground networks of hackers and technology 
pirates. 
Exploratory scenario 2: An unsustainable but more equal world 
In 2045, a highly egalitarian society has emerged under the pressure of massive 
environmental disasters. In the decades after 2016, floods, droughts, ocean acidification and 
other climate-related disasters led to a massive reduction in the global population and huge 
waves of migration. The global governance systems designed to tackle environmental 
problems broke down rapidly as temperatures rose. There was huge instability. Food-
producing regions collapsed, cities and coastal population centres were submerged and had 
to be abandoned, protectionism spread and trade ground to a halt. Property and wealth that 
had been accumulated over decades became worthless overnight. In a reversal of historical 
patterns, climate refugees began to migrate from previously more developed regions and 
cities towards rural areas and less-developed parts of the world. There was widespread 
disruption and some violence as people struggled to survive. As this process unfolded, 
population growth went into reverse. Under enormous pressure, traditional forms of 
government struggled to cope but eventually new, plural forms of governance emerged that 
focused on meeting people’s basic needs as fairly as possible, in order to minimise social 
upheaval and mitigate its many adverse consequences. Although the crisis drew attention to 
the impacts of ecologically unsustainable practices, the governance of the environment was 
focused only on crisis management rather than long-term resilience. Gradually, out of this 
crisis there are signs of an emerging cosmopolitan human identity and a more equal 
distribution of resources, but at a very low level of material subsistence. However, aspects of 
horizontal equality also improved, for example patriarchy was undermined and women’s 
rights continued to advance as women became more embedded in resilience movements. 
Exploratory scenario 3: An unsustainable but secure and 
inclusive world 
By the year 2045, the ‘planetary boundaries’ (Steffen et al. 2015; Rockström et al. 2009a, 
2009b) have long been transgressed. Just under 30 years previously, a military elite had 
commenced a new space programme using public funds to seek resources from elsewhere 
in our solar system and develop technologies that would make it possible to sustain life on 
other planets. In the year 2025, the wealthiest 1 per cent of humanity boarded a spaceship 
and abandoned Earth, taking with them a huge supply of the planet’s resources (rather than 
people). New facts of life for those remaining on Earth included mass migration driven by 
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extreme ecological disasters, but the departure of the world’s elites created an opportunity 
for a new, more inclusive and egalitarian world order to emerge, based on human security 
through the sharing of scarce resources. A new and more muscular United Nations-type 
global governance regime has emerged, which provides a universal basic income and 
ensures fair access to resources for everyone on a global scale. The new dispensation has 
an authoritarian tinge, for example, criticism of the new world order is proscribed and 
environmental activism is outlawed. Sustainability is not on the agenda, instead, the priority 
is to divide and use all remaining resources on Earth for the benefit of the remaining 
humans. Meanwhile, a new space programme has been started, with the hope of finding 
another planet for everyone remaining on Earth. 
Exploratory scenario 4: A highly unequal but secure and inclusive 
world 
The group responsible for this scenario concluded immediately that a world could not be 
highly unequal yet also highly secure if security were understood as ‘security in the 
vernacular’ (Figure 3.1). Group members argued that high levels of inequality would 
necessarily imply an unequal distribution of wealth and power, which would certainly 
undermine the human security of individuals and groups. Therefore they felt obliged to resort 
to a more limited, classical understanding of security as protection from actual violence. The 
group also found it convenient to sketch their scenario of life in 2045 largely from the 
perspective of an individual country, China, which based on current trends seemed a likely 
candidate to achieve a more unequal but largely secure and inclusive society. 
 
Under this scenario, by 2045, China has fully emerged as an economic and geopolitical 
superpower. This has been accomplished without destabilising the incumbent powers or 
China’s existing political structures. The population as a whole enjoys full employment and 
stable, predictable livelihoods, presided over and policed by the Chinese Communist Party. 
State policies are paternalistic, inclusive, and sensitive to environmental sustainability. Crime 
and violence are effectively proscribed, ensuring that men and women enjoy physical 
security. However, though Chinese society remains inclusive and stable it has become more 
patriarchal, dominated by a small political and economic elite that owns a disproportionate 
amount of wealth and power. Men and particularly women suffer from political, income, and 
power inequality. However, this economic model continues to enjoy widespread legitimacy 
thanks to the country’s continued prosperity. There are few challenges to the Party but there 
are power struggles within the Party elite. 
 
At the global level, India has also risen as a major global power, which provides China with a 
significant geo-political competitor. India’s alternative model is more democratic, though 
more turbulent, and it attracts political refugees from China to seek asylum in India. 
Internationally, the two new superpowers have established neo-colonial relationships of 
patronage and alliance with African nations, with Nigeria and South Africa in China’s camp 
and Tanzania and Kenya forging closer ties with India. A new kind of cold war has emerged, 
in which the allegiances of former developed countries of the West are split. The United 
States has built stronger relationships across the Pacific Ocean with China while Europe has 
built stronger ties with India. Russia has declined in influence due to its dependence on oil 
and natural gas, which have been displaced by much cheaper and highly efficient renewable 
energy technologies produced in China and India. A Scandinavian social democratic model 
survives in a northern European niche, but this region is small and weak in comparison to 
the two new superpowers. 
Exploratory scenario 5: A highly unequal but sustainable world 
The group responsible for this scenario also found it helpful to imagine their scenario from 
the perspective of a particular country. In 2045, India has emerged as a global superpower. 
 30 
Its new development model espouses Gandhian ideals of simple and austere living, which 
have been imposed on the population as a culturally appropriate, indigenous and 
sustainable economic development model that will address the global climate crisis. This is a 
top-down agenda that has been imposed from above in the name of protecting the nation 
and the planet. However, Indian society is highly stratified and controlled by a small group of 
globally integrated, culturally homogeneous, super-rich, Hindu elites. A ‘Second Green 
Revolution’, based on new sustainable agricultural technologies and changes in 
consumption patterns, has ensured that India’s and the world’s record population can be fed 
without destroying the planet. Consumption and various human freedoms are highly 
restricted for many people. Vegetarianism has been imposed following a meat ban, and this, 
together with technological advances, has enabled crop production to keep pace with 
population growth. However, ecological sustainability has been achieved at the cost of high 
inequality and socioeconomic exclusion. Ethnic and religious minorities, women, and other 
marginalised groups suffer from discrimination. A very small middle class of highly skilled 
workers aspires to join the elites, however, the vast majority of the people belong to the 
lower class, whose basic needs are met in order to legitimise the system and mitigate the 
threat of revolution. Access to education, health and occupations are controlled and 
segregated. Some jobs are performed by robots rather than providing employment for poor 
people. Social media and information are subject to surveillance and control. Mandatory birth 
control measures are imposed on the lower classes, which are justified in the name of 
sustainability. 
 
Globally, many people aspire to the Indian dream; however, India’s borders have been 
sealed. Dirty and extractive industries have been sent offshore to Bangladesh and some 
African countries, externalising the environmental effects of Indian consumption. 
Discontented citizens in the ‘developing countries’ are forming a transnational rebel 
movement that poses a low-level threat to India and other superpowers. 
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Annexe B Integrated scenarios: Seeking 
positive interactions among all three 
themes 
 
The scenarios outlined in Annexe A were not polished, final products but stepping stones in 
the process of considering how all three of the strategic goals in which we are interested 
(accelerating sustainability, building secure and inclusive societies, and reducing inequality) 
might interact positively or negatively, and how they may realistically be pursued together. In 
this annexe, we present the three scenarios produced during the next step of the workshops, 
in which we invited the participants to turn their attention to building new scenarios that 
would (a) encompass all three themes at once and (b) sketch out pathways towards positive 
outcomes for each of them. We present concise versions of the scenarios as they were 
developed by the workshop participants. 
 
The first scenario from this set is extremely short. This scenario was produced by 
participants in the workshop on the theme of security and inclusion, which was the workshop 
in which we had too few participants to work on two separate ‘dystopian’ scenarios in the 
preceding phase of the workshop programme, as originally planned (see Annexe A). We 
found that, since the participants in this workshop had already had an energetic discussion 
about the interaction between all three themes of the project, it was hard for them to 
recommence the scenario-building exercise all over again but this time with positive 
attributes. Instead, the discussion moved naturally into a more reflective, analytical mode, 
focused on what the participants had learned from the insights generated during the 
process. We have incorporated these reflections into Section 5 of this report (Discussion). 
Scenario 1: Technological breakthrough leads to sustainable 
utopia 
In the world of 2045, new and environmentally sustainable technologies have created food 
and energy security and they now provide abundant public goods for the population. 
Technology and knowledge are generally Open Source and Open Access. Patents protect 
new inventions for just three years. Co-operative and employee-owned business models are 
at the heart of a more democratic economic system. Global leaders have recognised that 
equality, sustainability, security and inclusivity are interlinked, therefore they seek to tackle 
them together rather than pursuing them independently. 
Scenario 2: A new popular enlightenment of ethics and social 
responsibility 
By the year 2045, human values, priorities and behaviours have shifted significantly 
compared to 2016. Most people are now well informed about and more engaged with social 
and global issues. A widely shared identity of global citizenship has led people across the 
world to recognise their interconnections and the implications of their actions on others. This 
facilitates collective action, such as crowd-sourcing solutions to decrease inequality, 
accelerate sustainability, and build more secure and inclusive societies. For example, human 
beings collectively have taken responsibility for the problem of climate change and are 
tackling it together. Over-consumption and causing pollution are viewed as immoral and 
have become socially proscribed. Instead of consuming non-renewable resources, people 
seek experiences. In politics, movements of socially conscious citizens occupy political 
spaces and create new opportunities and options to tackle global issues in multiple ways, 
creating diverse pathways that tend towards ecologically sustainable and socially just 
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development. Values of sociability, neighbourliness, mutual support and citizenship are 
widely esteemed and celebrated. 
 
Citizens are able to hold their governments to account. Governments curtail conspicuous 
consumption and environmental pollution through taxation. Subsidies on irresponsible 
behaviour, such as the combustion of fossil fuels, have been abolished and replaced in 
some cases by taxes. Governments cooperate to combat tax evasions and loopholes. These 
measures help to secure the revenue that provides a transnational basic income for all. 
Citizens are supported by a strong publicly funded safety net. 
 
At the global level, new and stronger structures of global governance have been created and 
old ones have been reformed with mandates to pursue human security, equality, and 
sustainability. New global environmental institutions have the level of status and influence in 
2045 that the international financial institutions enjoyed in 2016. The Sustainable 
Development Goals, which were reached in 2030, were replaced by the Security/Inclusion, 
Equality, and Sustainability Goals (SIESGs), including strong accountability mechanisms as 
well as mechanisms of soft power to hold states to account, such as through a regular 
SIESG development report that gives an account of progress towards the goals. 
 
Patents now protect inventions for just three years, which diminishes incentives for 
corporations to engage in rent-seeking behaviour and lawsuits and instead encourages real 
innovations from big companies as well as entrepreneurs and small, agile start-ups, often 
supported by crowdfunding. In this situation, companies make money by solving problems 
and improving products and services. A system of licensing makes new technologies widely 
available for use by anyone. Meanwhile, states behave in entrepreneurial ways to create 
new value for citizens; technologies generated with public funding are automatically Open 
Access, unrestricted by intellectual property rights. Innovative companies nurture creative 
platforms that bring together people, encourage conversations and promote participation. 
Developers of new technologies typically encourage public deliberation and assume their 
social responsibilities. Technology is increasingly democratised, and is curated and shared 
collectively at local and community levels. Fears that innovation would dry up if 
entrepreneurs were not granted exclusive ownership of their innovations were unfounded; in 
this innovation-friendly environment the pace of innovation actually accelerates. 
 
Smart cities have emerged around the world, characterised by bottom-up participatory 
decision-making and solutions that are social as well as technological. Citizens are able to 
hold companies to account due to new laws on transparency and liability. Businesses are 
generally responsible, transparent, and major participants in society. ‘Impact investing’ 
(investing for the sake of creating social benefits) and social entrepreneurship have become 
conventional. A new wave of peer-to-peer investment and business models has removed 
barriers to entry and seen more and more people become entrepreneurs. Materials are re-
used, re-purposed, and recycled in a circular economy, in fact, many companies have 
stopped marketing physical products and instead sell services, utilities and experiences. 
This has created an incentive to build products that are more durable, modular, and easy to 
maintain and recycle, which has reduced the toll of human activity on the environment. 
 
Life-long education now produces well-rounded citizens and equips them with a range of life 
skills. Children and adults learn how to live harmoniously with nature and each other. 
Educational curriculums are gender-neutral and accessible to everyone. Learning models 
are flexible and operate over global Open Access platforms. Social status is now based on 
celebrating creativity and conviviality rather than material possessions and economic wealth, 
which gives rise to a more mentally healthy, creative and socially engaged population. Wider 
involvement in politics helps to keep governments accountable. This well-educated, socially 
conscious and engaged global citizenry receives a basic income from the state, which 
means that people work fewer hours in conventional paid jobs and spend time doing 
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voluntary work, creative projects, gaining new skills, developing social enterprises and 
exercising different parts of their personalities. 
 
Although the world has advanced significantly in terms of security, inclusion, equality and 
sustainability, human society still faces some challenges and there are dissenters from the 
mainstream of society. People now commonly live to over 120 years old, and health-care 
costs are skyrocketing. Some religious and ecological groups in society object to the 
‘unnatural’ prolonging of human life. Some people resent paying taxes so that a minority may 
sit around all day consuming entertainment, wasting time on social media, drug taking and 
other vices. Libertarians fear that strong governance structures have created an 
overpowering global government that seeks to control and exploit the population. Anti-social 
and anti-environmental activities are illegal, yet they still flourish underground and on the 
dark web. 
Scenario 3: Participation, inclusion and accountability in 
democracy and economy 
Ongoing financial and economic crises during the 2020s and 2030s eventually create a 
public and policy backlash against the financial sector and free-market ideology. Financial 
institutions are now tightly regulated and social values such as solidarity and justice now 
dominate political and public discourse. Political and economic power has become more 
widely distributed, into the hands of citizens and consumers. This is reflected in processes 
such as participatory budgeting for cities and regions, and democratically managed 
stakeholder capitalism in business. States provide a universal basic income and essential 
public services, which liberate human potential and involve more people in productive and 
socially valuable work. As a consequence, more people have a direct stake in the economy, 
politics and civic life. More people have jobs, but people spend less time in paid work in 
2045 than they did in 2016; however, they also value paid work less and place a higher 
value on priorities such as sustainable and ethical behaviour. Individualistic consumption 
patterns have declined as the sharing economy has spread. Gender equality has increased 
through behavioural and cultural changes as well as formal policies. Men and women enjoy 
equal access to paid employment, receive equal pay for equal work, and share substantially 
equal responsibilities for domestic and care work, which are valued and celebrated as highly 
as paid employment. Violence against women has substantially decreased. States and 
employers share the responsibility to provide childcare and elderly care facilities that support 
individuals and families to engage in productive and satisfying work. 
 
Many people see themselves as global citizens and express solidarity transnationally rather 
than nationalistically. People are able to move freely across territories to live, work, study 
and recreate, and national borders are now largely symbolic. A representative citizens’ 
council of the United Nations directly represents citizens’ interests to governments, 
international agencies and development organisations. New regimes of global governance 
regulate global financial transactions and a progressive system of global taxation 
redistributes the wealth of the richest citizens to produce various public goods, including the 
basic income for all. Tax havens and tax loopholes have been eliminated, which helps global 
institutions to generate the revenue needed to implement social programmes. 
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Annexe C Workshop participants 
 
The scenario workshops were designed with the benefit of expert guidance from Alun 
Rhydderch of the School of International Futures, who also co-facilitated the workshops and 
assisted with the documentation and analysis of the workshop discussions. 
Workshop 1: (In)Security and in/exclusive societies 
 
Participant Affiliation 
Dolf te Lintelo Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Philip Mader IDS 
Cathérine Müller IDS 
Patta Scott-Villiers IDS 
Annie Wilkinson IDS 
Workshop 2: (Un)Sustainability 
 
Participant Affiliation 
Saurabh Arora  Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of 
Sussex 
Aditi Bhonagiri IDS 
Jonas Colen Ladeia Torrens SPRU 
Melissa Leach IDS 
Gordon McGranahan IDS 
Seamus Murphy IDS 
Peter Newell School of Global Studies, University of Sussex 
Pedram Rowhani School of Global Studies, University of Sussex 
Wei Shen IDS 
Adrian Smith SPRU 
Workshop 3: (In)Equality 
 
Participant Affiliation 
Deepta Chopra IDS 
John Gaventa IDS 
Richard Jolly IDS 
Bruno Martorano IDS 
Giulia Mascagni IDS 
Sohela Nazneen IDS 
Ricardo Santos IDS/UNU-WIDER (United Nations University World 
 Institute for Development Economics Research) 
Jodie Thorpe IDS 
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